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A Neglected Ricardian Aspect Of Labor Supply
Abstract
In this paper we develop and estimate a model of the supply of personal services, which is applied to
physicians. Typically the services are embodied in the consumers who demand them, in the sense that resale is
costly. At least this is true of medical care, which according to a recent analysis (Grossman, 1972) is combined
with personal contributions to health such as exercise time to create" additions to the patient's health. Our
view of the supply of medical care emphasizes the choice between treating a smaller number of patients (more
generally, dealing with a smaller number of clients) more intensively and a larger number less intensively, a
choice which we term the Extensive-Intensive Allocative Question,
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Part A: Theory
I, Introduction
In this paper we develop and estimate a model of the supply of per
sonal services, which is applied to physicians. Typically the services are
embodied in the consumers who demand them, in the sense that resale is
costly. At least this is true of medical care, which according to a recent
analysis (Grossman, 1972) is combined with personal contributions to health
such as exercise time to create" additions to the patient's health.—^ Our
view of the supply of medical care emphasizes the choice between treating a
smaller number of patients (more generally, dealing with a smaller number of
clients) more intensively and a larger number less intensively, a choice
which we term the Extensive-Intensive Allocative Question, Our analysis r
resembles Ricardo's famous discussion of the margins of land cultivation,
but is to be sharply distinguished from previous studies of intensity of
factor use (Rosen, 1968, 1969; Nadiri and Rosen, 1974). These studies inves
tigate the interrelations of stock input measures such as employment and
>
capital, and intensity of input measures such as hours per man and the capital
utilization rate. Our analysis in marked contrast examines the interactioii
1
between physician hours per patient and the number of patients, even holding
constant total hours of work per physician and his utilization of hospital
and clinic services. This difference arises from our interest in the allo
cation of work effort to consumers^ as opposed to the demand for intensity of
factor use by firms.
-2-
Physicians, according to our appiroach, combine their own services and
other inputs such as nursing care, and medical equipment services to produce
medical care for each patient separately, so that treatment of each patient
can be compared to a miniature production process. Our view of the medical
practice treats the physician as a multiple job holder who decides on the
number of jobs (patients) he wishes to hold by choosing the size of prac
tice; while for the most part, in a sense later described, we rely on demand
conditions to determine the quantity of medical services per patient, and -
indirectly, physician hours per patient. Nevertheless, the amount of time
in each job (i.e., spent with each patient) is regarded as flexible so that
our analysis bears a closer resemblance to the model of Huffman '(1977)
than to the model of Shisko and Rostker (1976) among the previous studies of
2/
multiple job holding.
The existence of unmeasured variation in the quality of medical care
creates problems of interpretation and estimation in most models of medical
3/
care, and ours is no execption.— In particular, the interpretation of price
data is made ambiguous since price can reflect hidden quality variations
and the usual quantity data tend to omit them.—^ Since our central focus is
upon the Intensive-Extensive Allocative Question, we do not develop a full
Hedonic model, though we indicate at various points how we would modify our
analysis to accomodate choice of quality as well as quantity, and we attempt
in the empirical work to control for quality variation by stratifying re
gression samples by type of medical care, and entering physician characteris
tics in the price and quantity regressions for the restricted samples.
The remainder of Part A is arranged as follows. Section II presents
a model of the demand for health care which is a modest variation on the
theory of demand for health developed by Grossman (1972) and is accordingly
brief. Its implications are developed for the allocation, of working time
3aad medical facilities by physicians. Section III develops a model of
physician's labor supply which centers on the Intenslve-^tenslve Allocative
Question and includes the choice of supplying multiple qualities of care.
II. The Demand for Medical Care
Patients in our analysis are utility maximizers who can alter available
or healthy time and their wage rate by adding to their health.—"^ Since
healthy days and therefore health may enter the patient's utility function,
health may be a consumer's as well as a producer's good. The patient com
bines time devoted to increasing health with different kinds of medical
care using a household production function which depends on his personal
characteristics. In this paper, we treat quality of medical care as discrete,
impounding all other differences in care in a residual standing for unmeasured
variations in quantity. There is a finite number ^ of qualities of medical
care, a view which we believe harmonizes well with our data; one can undergo
an appendectomy or tonsillectomy, and the physician with more excellent
training or longer experience simply supplies more services per hour than
his lesser skilled counterpart.
The utility function of the patient depends on market goods X, leisure
L, and perhaps healthy time F, defined as total time T minus sick time S,
or F =» T- S.—^ Thus his utility function is
U=U(X,L,F). (1)
4The patient allocates his time subject to a total time constraint,
T = L + H + M + S, (2)
where H = work time, M = time devoted to health care. His money income
constraint is
WH + V = PX + Z R.Q. , (3)
1 J J
/
where W is the patient*s wage, V his unearned income, P the price of market
goods he consumes, the price, and the quantity of the j-th quality of
medical care which he purchases. Finally, healthy time (F = T - S) and the
wage rate are assumed to be positive functions of health, where health is
the sum of an endowed level E and a net addition I. Therefore we write
o
F = F(E^ + I), M'>0 (4)
W= W(E^+I), W'>0. (5)
The production function for I depends on heilth care time M and medical
care (j = 1, ..., s), so
I - I(M, Q^, Qg)» (6)
where positive marginal products of health care inputs are assumed.—^
5/
The Lagrangean function corresponding to equations (1) through (6) is
L = U(X,L,F) +X[W(T-L-S-M)+V
- PX - S R.Q.1. (7)
1 3 3
First order conditions are
U - XW = 0 (8)
U„ - XP = 0 (9)
X
UpF»I^+ X(WHI^ - w+ WF'y = 0 (10)
U^F'I^ + X(W'HI^ - R. + WF'I^ ) < 0, (11)
J 3 3
3 =1 ... s
5 U
where , etc. Abstracting from the value of health as a
consumer's good, so that U„=0, conditions (10) and (.11) can be interpretedj.
to mean that the marginal cost of health care inputs equals or exceeds the
value of their marginal product, or
W « (W'H + WF') (10)'
R,> (W'H + WF') I. i QD*
J'
where W*H + WF' is the shadow price of additions to health, which is the sum
of the value of incremental wages (W-H) and the value of additional time
(WF'). Notice that we have allowed for the possibility that purchases of
medical care of type j may be zero.
Our main interest lies in the demand for medical care» and shifts in this
8/demand.— A higher wage W, greater responsiveness of wages to health W',
longer working hours H, and greater responsiveness of healthy time to
health all imply increased marginal benefits of medical care, larger amounts
69/
purchased, and a greater likelihood of positive purchases,— In particular,
the higher are wage rates and earnings, the greater the demand for medical
care,-^^ Moreover, if healthy days do not enter the utility function, the
patient^s demand for medical care is affected only by shifts in the'monetary
costs and benefits, implying that nonwage income does not affect the demand
for health care,-^^
3
Additional variables shifting the demand for medical care are patient's
age, education and sex, which all enter through the production function
for additions to health. Age increases (decreases) the demand for medical
care if the demand for health decreases by less (more) than the endowment,
even though age raises the cost of maintaining health. Education raises
(lowers) the demand for medical care if the saving in medical care is less
(more) than the derived increase in demand for medical care due to ah educa
tion-induced fall in the marginal cost of health.
For oiir purpose, the main implication of this analysis is that levels of
medical care are determined by patients, and shifts in the level of medical
care are determined by shjLfts in the characteristics of patients. Notice that
we are not assuming the patient chooses the level of physician's time or
other inputs into medical care; rather, he purchases medical care itself,
12/
which is a bundle of inputs assembled for him by the physician,—
3
Since for a perfectly elastic supply curve in a competitive case, demand
1
wholly determines the amount of medical care, the per capita demand for medical
care is wholly determined by the distributions of the patient's wages and
13/
their other characteristics,—
There appear to be two principal counterarguments to this conclusion.
First, it is assumed that physicians can increase patient's demand for medical
care beyond the utility-maximizing amount. In other words, patients are
assumed to be incapable of estimating the effects of treatments, an inability
which may be related to the lag in these effects. Since there appears to be
7an optimal timing of medical care which creates a sequence of patient visits,
excessive medical care (as defined above) is reflected in an excessive number
of repeat visits,—^ The hypothesis suggests a "knowledge gap" between
physicians and patients; if one believes this, then the number of repeat
visits is made to depend on some measure of the difference in patient's and
physician's information. We propose as an empirical counterpart, the dif
ference in educational levels of physicians and patients
The second counterargument denies for several reasons that the supply
of medical care is perfectly elastic to the patient. First, imperfect in-u
formation renders the price of medical care a function of the patient's
search. Since we would expect the patient to search more and pay a lower price
the greater is his demand for medical care, the supply curve inclusive of
search efforts is downward sloping. Second, imperfect experience rating
under medical insurance plans may drive the marginal cost of medical care to
the patient below the average cost, implying falling price to the patient.—^
The counterarguments cpnstitute^exceptions to the proposition that
patients determine the level of medical care, either in the sense that the
empirical demand curve is independent of physician's supply, or in the sense
that the price of medical care is fixed to the patient, although assessing
their importance appears to be econometrically difficult.—^
III. The Physician's Supply of Labor
The physician also maximizes his utility U*, which we write as a function
18/of market goods X* and leisure L*.— We omit additional consumption variables,
because their use is peripheral to our analysis. For example, it has been
asserted that physicians behave like Altruists, which leads them to make
voluntary contirbutions in the form of lower price to patients with lower
8incomes. We neglect.this argument and others, simply' because we cannot dis
entangle their influence from other sources of price variation in the data.
Physician utility is maximized subject to net income Y, which is the sum of
wage and entrepreneurial income derived from the practice, and property income,
less payments to other productive factors used in providing medical care.
Our formulation of the physician's sources of income explicitly differentiates
between physician hours per patient h, and the number of patients N, where
loweroase letters indicate per capita variables. Moreover, since medical
i
care is provided on a per patient basis, it depends on per capita inputs of
(
physician's time h and other inputs k. Because the essence of our model can
1
be shown more simply if we assume specialization in providing a single quality
of care, the main part of our analysis treats this case, though we show how
to extend it to handle multiple qualities of care at appropriate points.
A third equation for the physician's time budget closes the model.
The physician's utility function is therefore
U* = U* (XA,'L*) , (12)
which is maximized subject to a (net) money income constraint,
Y = P*X*. (13)
where P* = price of market goods. Net money income for a homogeneous grou]
of patients is defined as
Y = Vft + NR (a) Q [h, k, N-h^ e] - NS*k. (14)
where V* = physician's property income, N= number of patients, and Q=
9production function for care per patient. We assume positive marginal products
for all inputs entering Q. Also R = market price per unit of medical care,
S* = price per unit of cooperating inputs, ot = vector of market determinants
shifting the price of care, 3 = vector of determinants shifting the efficiency
of medical care. In equation (14) NRQ is the gross value of the practice,
NQ the total volume of services, Nh - H*, or total hours of work, and NS*k is
19/
the total cost of other inputs used in the practice, Nk their total volume.
Market price R is a function of market conditions a, including short-
term disequibria; and if the physician has monopoly power due to imperfect
information, R also depends on the quantity of care per patient Q. Since Q
is a per capita production function it depends on per capita inputs h and k,
f.
on total work hours NL if there is fatigue, monotony, or boredom [see
Chapman (1909) for a discussion of the relative importance of fatigue versus
other causes of decline in productivity]; and on a vector of efficiency var
iables 3. Included among the efficiency variables are physician skills
(quality of formal training, length of experience), physician health status,
20/
and possibly, availability of other inputs,^—
m
Total work hours are specified as the product of the number of patients
N and hours per patient h. If there were fixed time costs per patient f,
then total work hours would be the sum of total variable and fixed hours,
or N(h + f). Therefore, the physician's time budget (ignoring fixed time
costs) is
T* = L* + H* = L* + Nh. — (15)
The model consisting of equations (12) throu^. (15) has a structure
which implies that hours per patient and number of patients are chosen to .
maximize net income, at any level of total work hours. This follows from the
10
fact that only total leisure time, and therefore only total work time enter
the utility function.
The Lagrangean problem corresponding to this model of utility iriaximiza-
tion is, in the simpler case of no fatigue,
L ^ U* [X*, T* - NL] + X*[V* + NRQ - NS*k - P*X*], (16)
substituting the time budget directly into the utility function. Note that
22/
if fatigue is not operating, Q does not depend on total work hours.—
In a setting where imperfect information or physician-determined demand
are in^ortant, the physician chooses both the level of medical care per patient
and the number of patients. This implies that physician hours per patient
and other inputs are chosen independently of each other and total work hours.
But if we assume as an approximation that patients choose the level of care
which they receive, then Q = Q , and physician hours per patient cannot
o
be independent of other inputs per patient k, since the physician moves
along an isoquant in choosing the method of care. We write
h = h(k. Q^, 3), (17)
to indicate this dependency, where h has been eliminated as an independent
23/variable using the relation Q= Q^.— First order conditions of (16),
subject to the additional constraint (17), are
U*X* - = 0 (18)
-U*^^h + A* (RQ - S*k) = 0 (19)
-NU*^^hj^ - A*NSA = 0 (20)
V* + NRQ - NS*k - P*X* = 0 (21)
11
where U* . =—^ , etc., and in particular, h, is the slope the iapquant
X* X* ^
Q^, or
h = " ^ 24/ (^22)
k Qh •
Our discussion of equations (18) through (21) is limited to the un
familiar conditions, (19) and (20). Equation (IS) states that the monetary
equivalent of the loss of leisure due to treatement of an additional patient
(U* . h/X) is equated to the gain in income, or net income per patient
L*
(RQ - S*k). Equation (20) states the equality between marginal rates of
substitution in consumption and production; put differently^ the ratio of
the marginal products of h and k equals the ratio of the implicit price of
time (U* . /A*) to the market price of other inputs S*,
L*
A geometric interpretation is given in Figure 1, The physician*s
budget line is ABF, but the linear earnings segment is based on the assumption
that medical care is produced according to constant returns to scale. To
see this, note that AE^ is the physician^s time per patient 1,
physician's time per patient 2, and so on, where all patients receive the
same time and care in this illustration. Figure 1 assumes that, as hours
per patient 1 increase from A to and other inputs k increase in proportion,
the implicit wage is fixed, which implies a constant returns to scale pro
duction function; because, the implicit wage is the value of marginal product
RQj^. The price of care is fixed, implying fixed as h and k change in equal
proportion. Moreover, BF is itself a kind of envelope curve, since patients
can demand an amount of care in excess of the actual- amount, though at
a price less than the market equilibrium. In Figure 1, patient 1 demands
an amount of care which given an optimal production decision by the physician
implies a derived demand for the physician's time of AE^; beyond AE^, the
patient's demand price for medical care falls continuously below the market
12
price, and the value of marginal product also falls continuously, reflecting
the decline; this is shown in the figure by segments like The physician's
hours per patient are flexible above AE^, ^1^2* sense that they
could be supplied in excess of those amounts, though the decision would not
'f
place the physician on the boundary of his opportunities, and would therefore
be inefficient. This discussion also shows that the envelope is really a
series of points B, C^, C^, and is therefore discontinuous, though
we assume the hours intervals sufficiently small that the discon-
tinuites can be ignored and the physician locates exactly at C^. The equili
brium indicated at is the graphical depiction of equation (19).
The physician's optimal choice of leisure and market goods under the
assumption of constant returns is invariant with respect to equal percentage
increases in h and k, accompanied by an equal percentage decrease in N.
In other words, the solution is homogeneous of degree zero in h, k, and
The proof proceeds in the usual manner: optimality conditions are unchanged
if h, k, and N shift as indicated. In particular, the budget constraint is
the same, and marginal utilities are the same relative to marginal benefits
25/or marginal costs,— The economic meaning of this result is that the hours
of work decision is separate from the allocation of labor supply decision,^
In our model, the patient determines the amount of care which he receives,
while the physician determines the hours spent per patient through optimal
production decisions, constrained by the level of per capital medical care
(see the discussion surrounding equation (17) above). Indirectly, therefore,
the patient determines physician hours per patient, while the physician
entirely determines total work hours, and the size of practice is jointly
determined.
The invariance property which we have discussed is shown in Figure 2.
In comparison with Figure 1, total work hours remain the same (ignoring
FIGURE 1
L*
T-Nh E2 A
FIGURE 2
L*
T-Nh El E
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discontinuities), more hours are spent per patient, assuming an increase
in individual demands, and fewer patients are treated. The market price of
medical care is unchanged, reflecting a hidden assumption that the number
of physicians has risen to meet any net increase in the total demand for
care.
Comparative statics of the model are appealingly simple. An increase
in the market price of medical care R has the usual income and substitution
? 6 /
effects on total working time.— Total working time decreases if leisure
is a normal good and the income effect dominates: the geometric interpretation
is shown in Figure 4. We assume in that diagram a net increase in the slope
of the budget line, though we should make it clear that the slope is endo-
27/
genous to the model.— It is clear that the slope of the indifference curve
through the point K must be steeper than the slope of the new budget line
and the slope of the indifference curve through the point J. The converse
holds in Figure 3.
The effect of a rise in R on hours per patient depends wholly on the
impact of the shift on the price of time (U* a /^*)> as equation (20) shows
clearly, since
h, =
_ - Qk _ - S*
k Qh (23)
But the price of time must increase, since hours per patient must decrease,
due to an in5)licit rise in the comparative resource cost of h.-^^ Moreover,
the slope of the physician*s indifference curve must be higher in the new
equilibrium position, since the slope of the indifference curve is higher
when the price of time is higher.—^
Therefore, even if income effects dominate, implying that total hours of
work decrease, size of practice may Increase if there is a sufficient decline
14
30/
in hours per patient, the quantity of medical care per patient held constant.—
If the price of other medical care inputs rises, these inputs decrease,
hours per patient increase, and size of practice may decrease. Whether the
size of practice decreases depends on the response to the downward rotation
of the budget line which follows because the decline in the marginal product
of labor implies the income and substitution effects of a falling wage
declines, R constant). If total work hours increase, size of, practice may
also increase, even though more time is spent with the individual patient.
Of course, it is crucial to consider in each case the reasons why a
change occurred. Thus if market price R increases, Q may also increase, be
cause market demand rises along an imperfectly elastic supply. Therefore,
to analyze this case more fully, the loosening of the Q constraint must be
incorporated into our reasoning. In the case at hand, it would simply mean
that a sufficient rise in Q could eliminate the decline in hours per patient,
leading to a clear reduction in the size of practice.
Some implications for public policies with respect to medical care follow
from this analysis. Let medical care to the patient be subsidized, raising
> - s
the quantity of care per patient; then, for the moment holding the price of
care constant, physician hours per patient increase and practice decreases^'
as we proved earlier. However, a sufficient rise in the price of medical
care brought about by the subsidy through an increase in patient demand could
decrease physician hours per patient and even increase the size of practice,
if hours per patient fell by more than total physician hours, assuming a
dominance of income effects as the physician's implicit wage rises, A sub
sidy specifically aimed at other inputs into medical care than the physician's
time decreases hours per patient and total physician work hours if the income
effect of a rising implicit wage again dominates. Such subsidies may increase
the size of practice.
FIGURE 3
L*
T-NL
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D
FIGURE 4
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A
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Moreover, the model implies equilibrium geographic differentials in the
method of providing medical care and also the size of practices. If the price
of other inputs k differs systematically across areas, it is nevertheless
true that the implicit wage of physicians (RQ/h - S*k/h) must be the same as
long as the areas are part of a single market for physicians. Therefore, the
price of care should be higher where the price of other inputs is higher, less
care is provided to each patient because of the greater expense, and practice
size tends to be larger in those areas, since total labor supply is the same
under the assumption of a single wage.
This concludes the theoretical analysis.
APPENDIX
Part A
The Patient's Model
First order conditions of the patient's utility maximizing problem are
U_ - XW = 0
L
- AP = 0
R- (W'H +WF') Iq = 0
W - (W'H + WF') T = 0
M
WH + V - PX - 2 R.Q.
J J
= 0
(A.l)
for the simple case shere healthy time does not enter the patient's utility
(Up = 0) and there is a single quality of care. Differentiating (A.l)
totally we obtain the displacement system
U.
LL
U,
LX
U
LX
U.
XX
-W -P
SHjIQ
3Q
9q
3-M
3"M
-W
-P
dL
dX
dQ
dM
dX
dw
dp
dR - Hl^dw* - F'Iq dw
dW - Hl^dw' - F'ljjdw
-dV - Hdw + WdR
A2'
CA,2)
Using Cramer's Rule to solve for the appropriate derivatives, we obtain
JQ = - 3Q
3W
3Q'
I Q
an^r, dw ~ ~M'
I M
dWWhere HI. ^ + F'l. > 0
dw Q —
HU*
M dw M —
dW
- F'l ), (A. 3)
CA.4)
CA,5)
Now a2 T ^ ®>while T >0 , if Qand Mare substitutes in produc-
tion. Thus > 0 .
0 W
' ''Ai''
Pare B
The Physician's Model
First order conditions in the no-fatigue case are
^X* " 0
U*j,h + *(RW - S*k) = 0
^ (B.l)
NU*A - *NS* = 0
L* k
V* + N(RQ - S*k) - P*X* - 0.
Manipulation of the second and third conditions of (B.l) reveals chat
h = SfS: f ^ Q_ 1 \ (B 2)
k Qh ^S* k ^ ^
so that the ratio of hours per patient to other inputs is independent not
only of marginal utilities, but also of the size of practice N. In fact it
depends solely on technology, as revealed by the average and marginal pro
ducts Q/k, Qk/Qh; and on the price ratio R/S*.
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale
Q - Q(h.k) = k Q(h/k, 1) - kg(h/k). (B.3)
and Qh =g^(h/k), Qk - g - h/kg'(h/ic). (B.4)
B2
Using the symbols $ = h/k, and p= R/S*, the directipn of ^hift in $ is.
found through implicit differentiation of (B,2);
dO* = r (PS -1) + ^ pg' ] •
+ ^ g d p . - C5.3)
s
Substituting
1
PS 1 g-$g* ' ^ " g-$g*
into (B.5) and solving for the derivative,
d$ _ (g-$g') ^
dp ~ . $g" (B,6)
which is negative if the marginal product of/hours per patient is diminishing,
implying g" < 0, Thus, as p = R/S* increases, $ - h/k decreases, and vice
versa.
Since we have proved that h and k depend only on R, S*, Q, and tech^
nology, we write
h = m (R, S*, q, 3) CB.7)
k = n (R, S*, Q. g), CB,8}
where is the vector of technological shift parameters introduced in the
text, and m^ < 0, >'0, n^^ >0, ng^^ <0 as we have shown, while m^, n^ >0,
if h and k are normal factors.
To derive comparative statics results, we prefer to maxiiqize utility
through optimal choice of X* and L* on the assumption that CB.2) is satisfied
B3
and differentiate these first order conditions. In other words, we assume
optimal production decisions on the use of h and k have already been made,
so that net income has been maximized at constant leisure and constant total
working time, which can be shown to imply (B.2). We prefer this procedure
over the computationally more difficult alternative of differentiating (B.l)
directly.
The utility maximizing problem is simply
L = U* (X*, LA) + X* [V* + (T-LA) (RQ/h - S* k/h) - PAx*],
(B.9)
where we have used the fact that N = (T-LA)/h. First order conditions are
UA^ - X*V* = 0
UA - XA (RQ/h - SA k/h) = 0 (B.IO)
L*
VA + (T-LA)(RQ/h - S* k/h) - PAXA = 0.
Differentiating (B.IO) totally with respect to R and SA we obtain the dis
placement system
—
_ -
IJA
XAXA ^XAla _pft dXA
UA
XALA
- SAk/h) dLA
-pA -(RQ/h - SA k/h) 0 dXA
— _
0
XA[Q/h dR + R
dK
dR + R
3(Q/h)
9SA
dS* - k/h dSA
_ g* dR - s* dS*]
- (T - L*) [ Q/h dh + R 3(Q/h)
3R
dR + R dS*]
+ (T - L*) [ k/h dS* + S* dR + S* dS*]
d R o S A
(B.'il)
1 ,f-.
B4
We have shown that d(h/k) / d(R/S*) < 0; hence.
8(Q/h) ^ d(Q/h) d(h/k) . n Cr
aR d(k/h) d(R/S*) S* ^ ^ ^
5(Q/h) _ - d(Q/h) d(h/k) ^ . n
as* " d(h/k) d(R/SA) S*^ . ^
since < 0. Also we have that
^(k/h) ' - 9(k/h) «
9R ^ ' ' dS* '
Hence, for the second and third lines of the vector of exogenous changes for
(B.ll) we have proved that
8(RQ/h - S*k/h) . ^ a(RQ/h - S*k/h) . ^
BR . ^ ' 3S*
Using Cramer's Rule to solve for changes in L*, and writing 11-.= RQ/h - S*k/h
L*
for the price of leisure.
^ <«-"i
3L* r . .s 3LA .
~ f "^TT (T - L ) -^ ] , (B.15)
L*
^ * 9n_. .where _ <0 , .g- >0 . and ^ >0 , ^ <0
Hence if income effects dominate, L* increases with R because we have
shown that rises with R; on the same premise L* falls as S* increases,
B5
since n_ . falls as S* increases. Thus-we have shown that the usual income
L*
and substitution effects pertain for leisure.
Notice that since 9h/9R < 0, 3h/9S* > 0,
(±) (-)
3n -,9l* , 3h 1
"3r=
(±) (+)
i = "< + -I* ^
can be determined residually.
a 3
FOOTNOTES
This analysis is clearly applicable to the supply of legal services,
and many other kinds as well. Note that the difficulty of resale introduces
the possible complication of price discrimination.
Each of these models of multiple job holding may be the more reasonable
in its ovm context. In an industrial setting, the model of Shisko and
Rostker may be more reasonable, "since it treats hours of work as variable
up to a maximum, which accords with the (legislated?) scarcity of over
time hours in normal periods, and the flexibility of' industrial working
hours provided by the option of switching employers and job titles.
The wage in each job is treated as fixed up to a maximum, and thereafter
zero, implying a demand curve for hours of work in each job which is
downward sloping in extreme, step-function form, Huffman^s model was "
developed to analyze the off-form labor supply of farm people, and treats
wages in either farm or off-farm work as perfectly flexible. Due to the
presence of fixed factors on the farm, the marginal wage falls continu
ously in farm work; the wage in constant in off-farm work. The perfectly
flexible hours assumed in Huffman are more reasonalbe for self-employed
workers.
Feldman (1975) uses the Hedonic Hypothesis to .analyze these quality
variations.
Moreover, quality variation raises to at least three the number of com
peting explanations 'for price variation in medicine: price discrimina
tion, information-, and quality variation,
/
Fuchs (197 ) finds significant effects of health on wage rates.
Our model is cast in a static framework. With the exception of patient^s
age, life cycle variables are not included in our study. Later age can
be treated as shifting the marginal cost of any level of health upwards
so levels of health diminish from one period to the next due to diminishing
net investments in health. Of course, if the demand for health is suf
ficiently inelastic, gross investments can rise, since the demand for
health falls less than the supply, leading to a rise in the demand for
medical care.
If investments in health are possible even if no medical care.is pur- •
chased 1=1 (S,0,0, 0) >0; but if no patient time is devoted to"
health care, including visits to physicians, no investments•are possible,
then 1=1 (0, Q^, Q^, Q) = 0, 0 for some i. A CRS production
function which incorporates tnese properties is
I = S [s" + ( Z V Q.)" ],
which exhibits diminishing marginal productivity if positive amounts of
S and at least one of the are purchased.
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Part A of the Appendix derives the comparative statics of the demand for
medical care.
Jobs which require unusual effort may offer wages which are more respon
sive to health, thereby providing incentives to purchase medical care,
even if average wages are the same as those paid in less strenous work.
For an interesting analysis of the allocation of effort, see Becker
(1977). Since there is also some evidence that jobs which require more
effort also pay higher wages [see for example Edward Lazear (197 ), and
Robert E.B. Lucas (1977)], we are assuming an increase in other amenities
supplied by the more effort-intensive job.
A positive correlation between wage rates and earnings is implied by the
normality of market goods, which restricts the extent to which the
individual's labor supply curve can bend backwards.
Grossman (1972, pp. 55-63) uses family income as an explanatory variable
in a regression which estimates the demand for medical care. Since the
wage rate is held constant, he interprets the positive sign of the
coefficient on family income as a nonwage income effect. (197 )
fail to find any effect of nonwage incon^ on the demand for medical care.
In Section III we explicitly show how the per capita level of medical
care determines physician hours per patient.
The population aggregate is still assumed to be small relative to the
market for medical care, as in the case of a Census Tract.
This "Austrian" dimension of medical care presumably can be explained
by the importance of time in adding to health.
The education differential would be intered in a regression stratified
by typed of medical care, which would include patient's education, income,
age, and sex as additional explanatory variables.
Use of the differential is defended by the standard argument that
one component of economic value of education is its usefulness in as-
simulating new information. Therefore, the more educated patients are
relative to physicians, the less are the number of repeat visits,
severity of illness held constant, assuming the hypothesis of supply-
induced demand is valid.
Demand for medical care must cut supply from below to exhibit Walrasian
stability.
To test for the importance o^search, price variablitiy can be regressed
against a measure of the patieht's level of demand, such as the niimber of
visits per year.
Physician variables are written with an asterick wherever there are
counterparts for the patient.
i
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For the case of m qualities of care supplied by the physician, the
budget line is
m m
20
21
22
23
24
Y = V*
m
+ Z N^R^(a^) Q.[h., k., S N^(hj + f^), 3^]
- Z N.S* k..
1
Measures of availability such as hospital or clinic affiliation probably
do not reflect physician skills. Instead they seem to be indicators of
costJ the greater is the distance from a hospital, the less likely is
hospital affiliation. In other words, affiliation is a 0-1 decision
based on latent cost components. Since associations do affect the amount
of care, however, we prefer to treat them as determinants of form of the
the production function rather than disregard them compeltely.
In the m-component case, the time budget, including fixed costs f^^ is
m
T* = L* + Z N.(h. + f.)
Again, in the case where a practice entails m qualities of care, the
Lagrangean function is
m
L = U* [X*, T* - Z N.(h. + f.)] + X*[ V* +ill
m m
2 N.R.(a ) Q (h , k Z N (h + f ) , 3.)
J-XJ. XX J.^JJ J j-
m
- Z N.S? k, - P* X*] .
1 ^ ^ ^
First order conditions of this problem obviously include equations
showing equality of value of marginal product of per patient hours and
size of practice for any two qualties of care, abstracting from differ-
enfital effects upon the physician's utility.
No explicit cost of time appears to determine the level of h because we
are assuming that the price of time, U*^ / X* exceeds the alternative
wage. Thus / X* is the opportunity cost of time. For equal amenities,
total earning and the wage in the practice exceed their counter parts
in the physician's alternative job. More generally, we assume his utility
is highest when a physician.
In the case where fatigue exists, Q = Q(h,k,hN,3), < 0, and
h = h (k,N,Q^,3). Also we have that
, _ 3h _ - ^k
k"-Sk- •
t25
26
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Similary,
h
- Qh*''
and
where equations (19) and (20) are appropriately altered to include these
derivatives.
The conclusion holds where there is fatigue provided the effects of fat
igue are proportionate the level of output. Writing our equations (19)
and (20) in full using the results of fn. 24 [(18) and (21) remain the
same] we have
NLQ„.
-Uf* ( h - —S-) + (RQ-S*k) - 0, (19)'
L*
U* „— - A* NS* = 0 (20)'
If the effects of fatigue are constant per unit of output, and h, k, and
Q expand in the proportion 6>1, while N contract in the proportion 1/3
then each of these conditions remains the same. Constant returns to
scale pertain, so that and are unchanged.
The proportionality assumption implies that ® ^1 "
and also that = N^Q , thus holding constant total effects of fatigue.
But if total work hours remain constant, why should there be a different
total output?
A sufficient increase in consumer demand is assumed so that care per
patient Q is constant.
27 1
The price of leisure is = — (RQ - S*k), or net revenue per hour; it
is shown in the Appendix, Part B that U* rises as R rises, and decreases
as S* rises. Thus the equilibrium slope of the budget line rises.
The condition for this to hold is that the marginal product of L
diminishes.
28
29
See the Appendix, Part B and the preceding footnote.
The proof is simple:
U* U* P*
Thus the slope of the indifference curve is higher, since P* has
' IP ' • F5
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been assumed to be unchanged, when the price of time increases.
Clearly k increases as h decreases. In every case, the effects on k
•are the reverse of the effects on h, since Q is assumed constant.
